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Information asymmetries and conflicts of interest are theorized to inflate the cost of external
finance, but formal bank relationships are thought to ameliorate such problems and may even
lead to excessive l verage.  Bank oversight is associated with slightly higher leverage but not
with greater use of bank debt.  Older and cash-rich firms have lower leverage and less bank
debt, suggesting that information problems affected firms’ financing decisions; but bank
attachment appears not to alter these patterns.  The findings suggest that bank oversight had
little to do with leverage decisions, particularly short-term borrowing, in the later stages of the
German industrialization.
In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, German firms accessed a wide range of financing
sources–internal funds, bank current accounts, various types of bonds, and outside quity shares.  The capital
structure of these firms was based on manifold individual choices between external nd internal funding and,
in the case of external finance, between debt and equity instruments.  The universal banks, particularly because
of their supposed involvement in corporate governance, are widely viewed as the dominant institution in
German corporate finance; and as such, they may have played an important role in firms’ financing decisions.
This paper investigates the funding sources and capital structure of German corporate firms at the start
of the twentieth century and assesses the possible impact of formalized banking relationships on these financing
decisions.  Corporate finance theory suggests that information asymmetries and conflicts of interest
systematically influence the relative xtent of debt and equity financing used as well as with the choice between
2bank debt and bonds.  In titutions that facilitate access to information about firms or ameliorate conflicts of
interest between debt and equity holders may temper the problems that lead to inefficient financing decisions.
In the historical literature, Germany’s joint-stock universal banks are seen as such an institution.  These
financial supermarkets provided a full complement of services—commercial banking, securities underwriting,
and brokerage—for medium and large firms.  In addition, many of these universal banks held positions on the
supervisory boards of industrial joint-stock companies, voted equity shares in proxy for customers, and took
at least occasional, short-term stakes in companies.  It is plausible, at least on the surface, that this integration
of universal and relationship-based corporate finance may have given some firms greater access to external
finance and may have altered their decisions (perhaps even unwillingly) about he various ources of funds to
tap as they grew and matured.
Corporate financing choices are important.  Most firms need outside financing in order to invest and
grow rapidly, and different forms of finance present varying costs to the firm.  The ability to choose the lowest-
cost form of financing affects returns to inve tment and possibly the decision to invest at all.  If firm capital
structure r veals information about he presence of information asymmetry and conflicts of interest, hen it also
allows clearer insights into the potential financial constraints faced by individual f rms and the economy as a
whole.  Moreover, if formal bank involvement alters firms’ decisions, then we may infer a significant role for
banks in corporate governance and firm investment more generally. 
The effects of formal bank relationships, however, turn out to be surprisingly small.  Though there is
some indication of a positive relationship between bank oversight and leverage, neither leverage nor debt
maturity structure (proxy for bank debt use) changes markedly in the presence of formal bank relationships.
Controlling for other firm attributes, older firms have lower leverage and short-term debt, but bank attachment
is not associated with earlier than average reductions in leverage as firms mature or with alterations in the
predictors of short-term debt use.  The findings generally fall in line with predictions of recent capital structure
theories but offer little support for the idea that formal bank-firm relationships altered the financing options
or choices of German industrial firms.
3HISTORICAL AND THEORETICAL MODELS
This paper addresses an issue that concerns both economic historians and financial economists.  The first group
has long debated the role of the universal banks in the industrialization period.  This debate, however, has been
poorly specified and has yielded few concrete hypotheses about the impact of institutional structure on
industrial growth and development.1  Alexander Gerschenkron, for example, made sweeping claims about the
vital role that banks played in moderately ‘backward’ economies and pointed to the representation of bankers
in company boards as the primary means by which banks influenced firms.2  The older literature seems to
suggest that banks, because they had access to firms’ information and maintained at least partial control over
(at least some) corporations, resolved problems of moral hazard on the part of firms and conflicts of interest
between equity and debt-holders.  At the same time, the historical literature has always probed the more
nefarious side of banking relationships, emphasizing excessive control, abuses of power, and anti-competitive
behavior.  This bankenmacht debate raises the possibility that formal banking relationships force firms into
decisions they would not otherwise make and that may even be deleterious to firm performance.
While the historical iterature makes few explicit predictions about the influence of banking
relationships, it does clearly suggest that bank board memberships made some impact on firms’ decisions and
performance.  The choice of financing instrument is one of the most obvious arenas in which banking
relationships might have been influential.  Banks may have gained access to board seats in return for funding
new projects or younger firms for which sufficient equity funding may have been difficult o find (the venture
capital role).  Less plausibly, the banks may have used their existing votes to force over-borrowing in order
to earn interest off of attached firms.  On the other hand, the German banks may have gained access to boards
through the underwriting of equity issues, since they often held votes as a result of their indirect (proxy) and
direct ownership of shares.  The banks also stood to gain from underwriting fees and commissions, so they may
have pushed already-attached firms to float securities. 
The historical literature therefore motivates the following set of hypotheses to be tested (Table 1): first,
that firms with banking relationships, formalized through board memberships, u ed more debt han independent
4firms; second, that higher leverage arose mainly in the form of short-term debt (predominantly from banks);
third, that leverage, and particularly bank debt, declined as firms aged; and finally, that bank-attached firms
made arlier transitions to lower leverage (including less bank debt).  If the venture capital function or lending
motivation of banks dominates, then the first two hypotheses will prove correct.  If age (years since initial
public offering) proxies for information availability or transparency, and if lack of information i hibited access
to equity markets, then the third hypothesis will hold.  If banks removed barriers to equity markets, if securities
commissions motivated banks, or if banks’ presence on boards resulted from equity issues, then the fourth
proposition should also hold.  Finally, if the lending and issuing motivations of universal banks exactly offset
each other for all types of firms, or if bank relationships did not affect either lending or issuing decisions, then
all but hypothesis three should prove false.  Note that these hypotheses are all phrased as correlations, since
the qualitative literature proposes bi-directional causal links.  
These four propositions can be clarified and further motivated by two distinct lines of inquiry within
the corporate finance literature: the determinants of capital structure and the impact of banking relationships.
The theoretical literature centers on the idea that firms have information that investors do not have and that he
interests of debtholders, equityholders, and managers may not coincide.  In theory, information asymmetry
leads to opportunistic behavior or moral hazard.  These models start with the premise that debt is less sensitive
to the existence of private information than is equity.  Unlike fixed debt returns, equity returns depend directly
on information that may be unobservable by outsiders.  Moreover, firms have the incentive to issue new equity
when insiders believe shares to be overpriced.  Such information problems theoretically lead to the underpricing
of equity and the rejection of worthwhile projects by existing shareholders.  Consequently, in cases in which
it is difficult to determine firms' worth (either ex ante potential or actual outcomes), debt may impose lower
information-related costs on firms and should be preferred over equity.3  
Conflicts of interest between debt and equity holders (and between equityholders and managers) may
also influence the choice of capital structure.  Since debtholders bear the costs of failed investments but do not
share fully in the benefits of highly successful projects, equity holders have the incentive to take on excessive
risk.  Assuming debtholders expect suboptimal investment, debt will be priced accordingly and will pose an
5extra cost to existing shareholders.
Debt, of course, takes several forms.  Bank loans, because they are typically the most closely
monitored mode of finance, are usually seen as the first step to gaining a reputation for high quality and
efficient disposition of outside funds.  Such monitoring is thought to alleviate asset substitution as well as
under- and overinvestment.4  Monitoring, renegotiation, and the potential for rent-extraction due to the banks'
access to proprietary information makes bank debt relatively costly, so that firms mayavoid bank financing
when bond-issuance is feasible.5
Because of changing rowth opportunities, riskiness, and information availability, capital structure
is also thought to vary over firms’ life cycles.  In many cases, as firms age, relevant information becomes more
transparent to investors, new funding sources open up, and the hypothetical financial pecking order
emerges–from insider equity, to intermediated quity (venture capital), bank debt, bond debt, and outside
equity–to which firms gain access as they mature.6 Capital structure cannot fully adjust overnight, but the
infusions of new sources allow leverage to adapt gradually.
Bank relationships
Another strand of the corporate finance literature studies the impact of formal bank relationships on
the decisions and performance of non-financial firms.  This literature assesses the role of banks in ameliorating
problems that arise due to asymmetric information between borrowers and investors and due to conflicts of
interest between debt and equityholders; it also investigates possible xploitation of attached firms.  Thus far,
researchers have focused on the potential linkbetween formal banking relationships and lending conditions,
liquidity constraints, investment, sales growth, profitability, and rates of return; but so far, there is little
research on the connection between capital structure and bank relationships.7  Calomiris, “The Costs,”
however, brings the two issues together in reviewing the literature on the financial pecking order.  Specifically
referring to the German experience, Calomiris argues that firms move from bank debt to bond debt to equity
as they mature and that formal bank oversight partially substitutes for this seasoning process.  This argument
6yields hypotheses three and four laid out previously: all firms should access more equity, thereby lowering
leverage, as they age; but bank-affiliated firms should do so faster than average. 
Hypotheses one, two, and four hinge on the qualitative descriptions of banking relationships in the
German historical literature: board memberships, direct equity stakes, and proxy votes.  The previous literature
attributes particular importance to the practice of bank representation  clients’ supervisory boards as a
conduit of information, monitoring, and control, but board positions may also provide signals of credit
worthiness to capital markets.8  Historically, direct stakes have accounted for a very small share of bank assets,
and only in a handful of cases did the universal banks hold industrial shares for long periods. Banks did
apparently hold shares in proxy fo  depositors and therefore frequently maintained significant control rights
nonetheless.9  In other words, the banks often maintained control rights without direct rights to cash flows. 
 Depending on shareholders’ access to information, banks’ primary position as creditor may dominate
their incentives to act in the interest of equityholders whose proxy votes they hold.  If the dual incentives are
balanced, banks’ roles as both debt and equity claimholders may ameliorate conflicts of interest between the
two groups and reduce the potential for asset substitution problems.  In addition, if bank positions on firm
boards permit close monitoring and control over firms’ disposition of debt funds, then creditors may worry less
about excessive risk taking.  On the face of it, such influences should make debt relatively more desirable.10
If board membership represents commitment to a long-term relationship between a bank and a firm,
then a firm with a banker on its board should enjoy greater access to bank assistance in times of illiquidity or
distress.  Such influences may make bank-attached firms less averse to debt than they might otherwise be.
Legal limits on bond funding and the potential for bank abuse of potential monopoly power, however, may
offset such incentives for debt.
Clearly, theoretical models based on asymmetric nformation and conflicts of interest allow for
competing forces in determining firms’ capital structure (see Table 1).  Thus, the ultimate impact of bank
relationships is somewhat ambiguous.  While there seem to be more reasons to hypothesize a leaning toward
higher leverage among bank-attached firms, the net effect must be tested empirically.
7Testing capital structure theories
Harris and Raviv, “The Theory,” review a wide range of theoretical nd empirical literature on
corporate capital structure, and Rajan and Zingales, “What Do We Know,” seek further evidence from several
developed economies.  These papers suggest a number of firm characteristics that, if related to leverage, can
support or undermine theories of capital structure.  The two classes of models dealt with here–asymmetric
information (pecking order) and conflicts of interest–supplement one another and offer few conflicting
predictions.  Theoretically, anything that mitigates conflicts of interest or problems of asymmetric information
tends to promote greater use of outside finance and of equity in particular.  Thus, firm leverage is hypothesized
to increase with the extent of information asymmetry, liquidation value, managerial reputation, firm value,
default probability, and managerial equity ownership but to decrease with growth opportunities, investigation
costs, and the interest coverage ratio (Harris and Raviv,  “The Theory”).  These factors are difficult to measure
directly and therefore require several proxies: age, tangibility of assets, firm siz , and market-to-book value
of equity.  Table 1 lays out the main contributing factors analyzed here, explains the variables used, and
distinguishes among the various causes and effects of bank relationships.
In the analysis to follow, four characteristics other than age are controlled for in testing the hypotheses
articulated previously.  First, tangibility of assets (fixed divided by total assets) proxies for the availability of
collateralizable assets.  Under the asymmetric information and conflicts of interest theories, the existence of
liquefiable assets makes banks and bondholders more willing to provide credit, and is positively associated with
leverage. 
Second, because larger firms tend to be more highly diversified and therefore present lower risks of
bankruptcy than small ones, firm size (natural log of income) may relate positively to leverage.11  If size also
indicates lower investigation costs, then agency (conflicts of interest) theories would also predict a positive
relationship.  However, to the extent tha size proxies for availability and transparency of information about
the firm or for the company’s reputation in equity markets–and thus the firm’s ability to access additional
equity financing–leverage should relate negatively to size. 
8Existing models yield opposing results on the relationship of leverage to a third factor, free cash flow.
Pecking order models uggest that high-cash flow firms prefer to fund investment out of retained earnings and
therefore predict a negative correlation.12  Conflicts of interest  induce a positive relationship between leverage
and cash flow, since debt constrains firms’ ability to overinvest.
Finally, equity share price (market to book value) is often used to measure the quality of investment
prospects, and under agency theories trong growth opportunities are hypothesized to relate negatively to
leverage.  Market to book value may also relate to a firm’s reputation in equity markets, and strong past
performance may encourage share issuing rather an debt financing.  Thus, a negative correlation between
leverage and market-to-book value of equity might represent more than just the effects of investment
prospects.13 
DATA
The empirical analysis of this paper is based ona ran omly-chosen cross-section of 320 German joint-stock
companies in 1904.  The data come from the Handbuch der deutschen Aktiengesellschaften (HDAG)–an
annual reference manual reporting on every German joint-stock company.  The HDAG gives balance sheets,
profit and loss statements, li ts of supervisory and executive board members, as wel as histories of share
capital, dividends, and share prices (for listed firms).  In many cases, the HDAG also provides details of firms’
origins, purposes, and important developments.  
The year 1904 is used for a couple of reasons.  First, interlocking directorates between banks and
industrial companies, though presumed to have played an important role in the German industrialization, ly
became widespread in the last decade of the nineteenth century.14  Fi ding stable bank relationships requires
choosing firms after this point.  The use of a cross section of firms, while forcing the common assumption that
different firms represent one firm at various tages of its development, eliminates problems of serial correlation
and shocks (such as stock market cr shes or sudden inflation) that occur at varying points in different firms’
life cycles.
9The stock market crash of 1900-01 might raise concerns about the potential for survivorship bias in
the current sample.  If the crash weeded out those firms in the greatest distress, then the sample may include
unusually healthy firms with less variance in their financial structure than would a sample taken from shortly
before the crash.  Two factors all but eliminate such bias.  First, the crash, while causing a significant decline
in value, did not immediately wipe out a large portion of firms (31 Berlin-listed companies were in liquidation
or bankruptcy in 1902, as opposed to 21 in 1900 and 26 in 1899).  Second, the effects of the crash appeared
over a number of years following 1901, so that many distressed firms were still in existence at the time of
sampling (1904-05).  Only 26 firms (8 percent) in the current sample were founded after the crash.  Moreover,
since many firms stayed in business for several years even as they underwent liquidation, and since the
Handbuch reports all such firms, they are captured in the current sample.  Nonetheless, the empirical analysis
in the next section provides tests for survivorship bias.
The firms in this sample are all joint-stock firms, and thus have clearly accessed some quity finance.
However, many firms in this period were transformed into joint-stock companies while remaining largely in
the hands of their founders.  Thus, there is large variation in the extent of equity in the firms’ capital structure
and the dispersion of ownership of that equity.  In addition, choices about financing for expansion and new
investments may still depend on firms’ characteristics and their relationships to financial intermediaries.
Measuring formal bank oversight is fairly simple, since the data source reports the executive and
supervisory boards of all firms.  By matching the names of firm supervisory board members with the names
of directors of the principal universal banks, I create an indicator variable for this form of bank oversight.
Firms often maintained relationships with multiple banks, and in most cases of attachment, directors from more
than one bank sat on company boards.  Less than10 percent of firms had one-sided representation, in which
bankers sat on the company board without any reciprocation; and in only a handful of cases did one great bank
maintain the only seats on a firm’s board.  Other forms of bank relationships, such as direct ownership of
shares or control over votes in the general meeting of shareholders (by proxy), are exceedingly difficult, and
in most cases impossible, to measure in this period.  It is likely, however, that board memberships are
correlated with control rights in the general meeting of shareholders, whether direct or by proxy.15 
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Bank board membership is probably at least partly determined based on characteristics of the firms
involved; and those firm-specific effects may relate to the choice of financing instrument.  That is, bank
affiliation may be determined simultaneously with capital structure decisions at some point in a firm’s history.
If bank-affiliated companies would have had unusually poor access to debt financing, then attachment may only
raise such companies to the levels of leverage experienced by other firms.  By similar reasoning, affiliation may
equalize firms’ rates of access to new instruments in the financial pecking order.  Given the universal structure
of German banks, however, bank oversight might equally arise because of a firm’s desire to issue equity.
Empirical evidence in this, and in other studies, suggests that such selection bias is minimal. For example,
Fohlin (“Universal Banking” and “Relationship Banking”) indicates that bank-attached German companies are
larger and more liquid than  independent firms.  Both types of firms invest at comparable rates and perform
similarly.  Moreover, the fact that many relationships formed long before the sample period tends to loosen the
causal link from financing choices to the attachment decision.  Nonetheless, as noted previously, the statistical
relationships found here are viewed as correlations.
Table 2 summarizes the variables used in the following analysis, broken down by bank oversight
category.  Various measures of leverage as well as tangibility of assets (fixed assets as a share of total assets),
investment prospects (typically measured by the ratio of market to book value of equity), firm size (measured
by the natural logarithm of income), dividends, and profits all can be determined from the information
reported.16  Of course, market-to-book value of equity can be calculated only for firms with stock market
listings, since they are the only ones to report share prices.  Measures of leverage vary quite a bit in the
literature on firm capital structure.  For most specifications, this paper uses the ratio of debt to equity, both
measured at nominal book values and taken directly from firms’ balance sheets.  Other definitions yield
fundamentally the same results (see Appendix A for other measures).  
The last two columns of the table contain the results of probit models,in which a binomial indicator
variable for bank oversight is regressed on several variables of interest.17  The figures reported are the change
in probability of bank oversight given a one unit increase in the relevant independent variable. 
Leverage provides some useful prediction of bank attachment, though the effects are not enormous.
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A one-standard deviation increase in the debt/equity ratio from the overall sample mean of 0.64 to 1.42, for
example, raises the estimated probability of bank oversight by less than 10 percent.  Median leverage in the
sample is .50 (and 1.42 is around the 85th percentile), so leverage must be increased markedly to yield a very
noticeable increase in the probability of attachment.  Moreover, while unattached firms maintained debt-equity
ratios as high as 4, an attached firm was the most extreme case (debt-equity ratio of 7.4).18  These findings
foreshadow the subsequent tests of hypothesis one (that leverage is positively associated with bank oversight):
there is some evidence in favor, but the evidence is not overwhelming.
Similarly, firm age, measured as the number of years since becoming a joint-stock firm, relates
negatively but fairly weakly, to bank attachment.  A decrease in firm age by one year, from the overall mean
of 15.6 years, increases the estimated likelihood of bank oversight by one half of one percent (or approximately
6 percent for a one-standard deviation increase in age).  The negative prediction of age, however, is due
primarily to the fact that 19 of 20 old firms (at least 35 years ince founding as a joint-stock company) and all
three xtremely old firms (over 50 years: 52, 69, and 79) appear in the unattached sample.  Without controlling
for any other firm characteristics, firms under 10 years old have the same rate of bank attachment as the sample
overall–twenty-one percent–and the very youngest (1-2 years old) actually have a much lower chance of being
attached.
Two other factors correlate much more strongly with bank attachment.  Sectoral fixed effects (included
in column four but not in column three) clearly influence the oversight probability estimate, with bank board
membership being almost ubiquitous in some sectors and nearly absent in others.  Listi g i  Berlin, though
not in other markets, causes the greatest increase in the estimated probability of attachment: moving from
unlisted to listed raises the estimated likelihood of bank attachment by 16 percent.  Thus, while there are several
differences between bank-attached and independent firms, industry identification and stock market listings carry
the greatest weight.  These factors are therefore included as controls in the subsequent analysis.
12
Table 2 here.
TESTING THE FOUR HYPOTHESES
The four hypotheses can be tested various ways.  The first proposition holds that the lending motivations and
venture capital role of banks lead to relatively high leverage among attached firms.  That is, by implication,
other factors that favor equity have a secondary impact.  As a first step in investigating this idea, I measure
absolute differences in leverage among firms with and out bank relationships.  Tables 3 and 4 compare
debt-equity ratios for firms with and without bank board representation.  Table 3, showing several percentiles
of the ratio as well as a number of statistical tests for equality, indicates that companies with attachment to a
universal bank maintained somewhat higher leverage than those with no bank affiliation or attachment only to
a private bank.  The differences, however, are quite small over much of the distribution, and the statistical tests
of sample differences vary in their results.  
Tables 3 & 4 here.
A simple t-test of the difference of means between firms with and without any bank director on their
boards, as well as a one-way ANOVA test of means differences among the four attachment categories, suggests
that average leverage does vary somewhat.  Examination of broader measures, however, provides less
convincing evidence of such differences.  For all categories except provincial bank attachment, approximately
half of the firms had leverage of 0.5 or greater, and 20 to 25 percent of firms had debt exceeding equity.  Firms
with provincial bank attachments, though, fall into these two high-leverage categories at slightly higher rates
(62 and 35 percent, respectively).  
Further comparisons of distributions offers confirmation of this rudimentary test.  The Kruskal-Wallis
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(KW) test, a chi-squared statistic that tests the hypothesis that multiple samples come from the same
population, cannot reject he equality of the leverage distributions of attached and unattached firms (p=0.19).
The Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) statistic provides an additional test of the equality of two distributions (Table
4).19  These tests reveal that firms with provincial-bank attachments are largely responsible for apparent
differences in capital structure, and that he significance derives mainly from a relatively small number of firms
with moderately high leverage.  This same test indicates that the leverage distributions of firms with great-bank
attachments are not significantly different from those of all other firms (p=0.57).  Clealry, debt-equity ratios
are distributed similarly, though not identically, for bank-attached and independent firms.  Thus, in the absence
of controls for other firm characteristics, bank affiliation seems to have a small, but uneven, net impact on
firms’ capital structure.  These findings offer preliminary evidence that either bank relationships were loosely
related to firms’ borrowing decisions (either as cause or effect) or that the  countervailing forces offset one
another.  In either case, the first hypothesis can be accepted only weakly so far.
As noted previously, not all characteristics of the German system should lead unequivocally to higher
leverage.  In fact, some attached firms may have particularly ow leverage.  The fact that, in an uncontrolled
comparison, the attached and unattached samples have very similar leverage distribution functions (in other
words, the bank-attached population does not exhibit a bi-modal distribution of particularly high- and low-
leverage firms), mitigates concern about offsetting positive and negative selection biases; but it remains a
possibility to bear in mind.
An examination f debt composition sheds light on the issue of firms’ use of bank debt.  Though the
HDAG reports only the type of securities i sued, and not the funding source, inferences can be made about he
prevalence of bank debt from maturities.  Long-term obligations consist of bonds and mortgages, while short-
term debt includes bank advances, credits from other companies (including accounts payable), and sometimes
bills of exchange.  The historical literature emphasizes that most lending through universal banks took the form
of short-term, rolled over credits on current a cou , and that hese lines of credit were the primary means of
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financing new investment during the German industrialization.  Current account loans, particularly when made
on little collateral, could pose substantial risk to banks; board seats are thought to have offset part of that risk.
For the current firms, most of this non-tradable, short-term debt appeared under the heading of credits
(Kreditoren) or current account credits (Kontokorrent-kreditoren), a d only a few firms reported bank credits
under a separate heading.  Some short-term debt, particularly bills of exchange, could be traded, but, as they
were meant to be backed by real orders for goods, carried less risk than long-term debt.  Thes sourc s were
typically booked under acceptances (Akzept) or bills of exchange (Wechsel).  In the current sample, however,
these items appear much less frequently than the general credit item.  Thus, while it is difficult to determine
what share of short-term debt originated from universal banks, the category gives an upper bound on bank
credits and gives a good idea of firms’ use of short-term, non-marketable debt.  
From the cases in which the HDAG describes the sources of long-term lending, it is clear that much,
but not all long-term debt was marketable.  Some firms borrowed long-term through mortgages (Hypotheken),
but many firms used mortgage-backed securities and other types of bonds and debenture securities
(Obligationen, Schuldverschreibungen, Hypothekenpfandbriefe).  Since bank presence includes universal
banks, and not mortgage banks, the oversight variable should not relate strongly to mortgage debt.  Thus, given
the general lack of source information, the ratio of sh rt-term to total debt offers the best available proxy for
the extent of universal bank lending relative to other forms of debt. 
The results indicate a remarkable similarity in the use of short- versus long-term debt among the
sampled firms, regardless of attachment to a bank (Table 5).  Though the means and various percentiles show
a higher atio of short-term debt among the great-bank firms than the other types, several statistical tests
indicate that such differences are highly insignificant.  Even a one-sided t-test comparing the means of great-
bank debt maturity with all others yields a p-value of 24 percent.  Clearly then, bank-attached firms may have
used slightly more debt relative to equity, but they structured that debt in much the same way as independent
firms.  Thus, hypothesis two appears to be rejected in the current sample.20 
15
Table 5 here.
Multivariate tests of leverage decisions
More complex models are needed in order to evaluate the relationship between bank oversight and firm
leverage while controlling for the other elevant firm characteristics noted in the previous ection.  The strategy
is first to analyze baseline reduced-form odels uggested by the theory and then to evaluate the added impact
of a bank relationship variable.  Unfortunately, data constraints prevent the construction of proxy variables
for each empirical implication of the capital structure theories.  Nonetheless, several hypotheses can be tested
(refer to Table 1).  In line with the theoretical literature, and given the data available for the current sample of
firms, the first set of models estimates leverage as a function of fixed relative to total assets, the natural log of
income, net profits as a share of total assets (discussed subsequently), market-to-face value of common equity
shares, and theag of the firm (since becoming a joint-stock company).  As suggested by the probit analysis
of the bank relationship variable, the models include indicator variables to control for industry fixed effects and
for the existence of alisting on the Berlin or other German stock exchange.  Since only roughly one third of
the sampled firms had listings on a stock exchange, the model is reported with and without the share price
variable.
Because the dependent variable, leverage, is bounded below at zero, one might normally opt for Tobit
regression i  this case.  In the current sample, however, a few firms have extreme values of leverage, and it is
difficult to deal with them in a Tobit regression, short of discarding them.  Thus, I use robust regre sion, in
which extreme values are downweighted using a variant of the Huber limited influence stimator.  In the current
sample, approximately six percent of the observations are equal to zero.  This minimal amount of truncation
reduces the potential for bias in OLS regression.  As a check on the sensitivity of the coefficients to the
estimator used, however, I also estimate the models using Tobit and OLS regression with extreme outliers
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removed.  Coefficient estimates and t-statistics for all three models are very similar.21
The baseline results for this sample (Table 6) largely fall in line with those predicted by theory and
found in other studies.  Tangibility of assets, as expected, relates positively to leverage, however, the coefficient
estimates are statistically weak for all models.  Though weak in the base model, size coefficient estimates are
positive and highly significant in all other specifications; thus supporting the diversification or investigation
cost explanation ver the information transparency interpretation.  Also as predicted, both profits and firm age
consistently relate negatively (and highly statistically significantly) to firm leverage.22 
Obviously, given the cross-sectional nature of the data in this sample, the age variable reflects the
behavior of different firms at varying ages, rather than that of the same firms as they mature.  Though panel
data might offer more definitive results, given the apparent lack of a survivorship bias in the current cros
section, the negative coefficient of age still suggests he usefulness of age as a rough proxy for information
problems.  It is also worth noting that these findings support the third  hypothesis: total leverage tends to
decline with age.
Market-to-book value of equity relates negatively, but insignificantly, to firm leverage.  A significant
negative relationship would support both information and agency (conflicts of interest) heories, but since the
relationship s too weak to draw any conclusions, and since its exclusion increases the available sample to 310
firms, the remaining regressions drop market-to-book value of equity.  As expected, a negative relationship does
emerge between stock market listing and leverage.  Interestingly, the coefficient estimate for the ‘Berlin-only’
indicator is larger and much more highly significant than the corresponding fi ures for the ‘other-exchange’
variable.  The difference in both coefficients and significance may indicate that the Berlin market was more
important for equity issuers than were theprovincial exchanges.  Although the role of the stock exchanges is
beyond the scope of the current paper, such questions offer promising avenues of further research.
The foregoing models cannot test a complete model of capital structure, yet they can offer insight into
certain correlates of importance that should beacknowledged in evaluating the impact of banks.  The results
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so far provide stronger support to asymmetric information models than to conflicts of interest theories.  To the
extent hat the profit measure captures free cash flow, and that its relationship to leverage is negative, the
evidence l nds further credence to the idea that asymmetric information between borrowers and lenders and
between potential owners and managers influences the financing decisions of corporate firms.  These same
findings undermine th  conflicts of interest theory (that is, debt does not appear to be used to limit free cash
flow).  Though the leverage-cash flow relationship is the main direct test of the two theories, the proxy
variables less clearly reject he conflicts-of-interest theory.  The weak coefficients of market-to-book value
(proxying for growth opportunities) and of asset angibility (proxying for liquidation value) provide vidence
against conflict-of-interest in the context of early twentieth century Germany; but the positive findings on firm
size (as a proxy for diversification) support such theories.23  
Table 6 here.
Rerunning the leverage regressions using only short-term debt indicates that the hypothesized
determinants of capital structure enter similarly for maturity structure and overall leverage (Table 8).  Size is
still a significant positive indicator of short-term debt ratios, but the effect appears to be smaller.  Likewise,
both profits and age are negatively associated with short-term debt ratios, but the relationships are mostly much
weaker than for the total everage ratio.  Coefficients of both variables drop about two thirds in magnitude.
Thus, while the theories eem to describe the choice between debt and equity, they appear to do less well in
explaining the choice between types of debt.  This relative lack of differentiation, however, may result from
the organization f German industrial banks.  Universal banks may have had more information about firms than
would a specialized bond underwriter, since the bank likely also provided irect lending prior to issuing public
debt.  Thus, bonds and bank debt may have had greater complementarity in the universal system of the time.24
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Bank Oversight 
By including an indicator for bank attachment and the interaction of that variable with the original
independent variables in Table 6, a second set of econometric models evaluates the impact of bank affiliations
on firms’ capital structure, debt maturity, and the determinants thereof–thus providing further tests of the four
hypotheses.  The new regressions (Table 7) produce findings similar to the simple comparisons of firm
leverage: weak acceptance of proposition one.  That is, bank attachment appears to relate positively to leverage,
but the estimates are not robust to changes in leverage definition or model specification.25 
The regressions u ing only short-term debt also confirm the findings on debt maturity differences for
attached versus independent firms.  In particular, short-term debt is statistically invariant to the presence of
a banker in the firm supervisory board, thus fairly certainly rejecting proposition two (that bank oversight is
correlated with use of short-term bank debt).  Equations 2 through 4 in Table 8 use three alternative definitions
of debt maturity, while column 1 of Table 8 repeats results on overall everage (from column 3 of Table 7).
 The first two definitions of debt maturity, because they take short- term debt as a ratio of either long-term debt
plus equity or equity only, are the most comparable to the definition of leverage used previously.  Asymmetric
information models, such as Diamond’s “Reputation,” suggest that firms move to longer-term, traded debt
when information problems are less severe, thus predicting negative correlation between debt maturity and both
age and size.  This study also includes controls for stock market listing–a variable that should also proxy for
information availability.  The results are moderately supportive of the theory: both listing and age obtain
negative coefficient estimates (though the latter are smaller than those found for leverage overall).  Size is
positively associated with short-term debt, but the variable, again, may capture firm diversification more than
information effects. 
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Interactions between bank attachment and correlates of capital structure
Hypothesis four holds that bank oversight as dynamic information-related effects as well.  Thus, firm
age, which relates negatively to leverage in the population generally, should enter the leverage equation even
more negatively for bank-attached firms.  Such an information effect might be expected to be magnified, if
attached firms began with higher than average l verage, but their information problems were then resolved by
the appearance of the banker on the board.  In the new specifications, leverage still declines with number of
years as a joint-stock company, but bank attachment does not yield a larger negative coefficient estimate.  If
age proxies for seasoning and information availability, then the results undermine the idea that banks’ formal
oversight speeds firms’ use of equity instruments.  Thus, the findings clearly reject proposition four.
Table 7 here.
Two other interaction effects may offer additional insight into the influence of banks on firms’ capital
structure.  For example, in the current sample, bank oversight exerts a sta istically insignificant influence on
the coefficient of asset tangibility.  If bank board membership ameliorates information asymmetries between
banks and firms, then bank lending should be less sensitive to the availability of collateral.  Agency costs (due
to conflicts of interest) may also induce a positive relationship between tangibility and  leverage (refer to Table
1), and bank oversight should weaken this relationship.  Empirically, if bank oversight on company boards
made a noticeable impact on information availability to lenders or on conflicts of interest, we should find a
significantly weaker elationship between leverage and tangibility of assets among bank-attached firms than
among the general population of firms, but we do not.26  
A second effect involves firms’ responsiveness to cash flow.  C  fl  is a much stronger negative
correlate of leverage for bank-attached companies than for unattached firms.  If bank oversight eliminates
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information problems, then firms with such connections may experience no correlation between leverage and
cash flow.  That is, if the cost differential between inside and outside finance is eliminated, then the firm may
prefer to use retained earnings for other purposes than to reduce leverage.  It is important to bear in mind that
the relationship between cash flow and leverage is likely to be non-linear, so that cases in which the cost
differential between debt and inside fu ds is reduced but is still significant may yield no change in cash flow
coefficients.  The findings suggests the opposite of information improvement: though all firms decrease their
debt or increase their equity in response to higher cash flows, those with banker board members eact more
vigorously.  The negative relationship between profitability and leverage is seen as evidence of asymmetric
information between suppliers and demanders of capital.  Given the potential nonlinearity in the relationship
between leverage and cash flow, however, a more negative relationship may not indicate greater information
problems.  Nonetheless, the fact that the negative relationship is not offset for bank-attached firms does suggest
that information problems or conflicts of interest persist even in the presence of bank board representation. 
It is tempting to hypothesize that attached firms’ response to cash flows results from constraints placed
by bankers, or indicates a desire of managers to extricate themselves from bank-controlled debt.  This question
requires further esearch, but the results on debt maturity offer at least preliminary evidence.  Of particular
interest, bank oversight is associated with no significant changes in the sensitivity of debt structure to either
age or cash flows.  If firms desired to limit the control of banks, short-term bank debt would have been the
place to start.
Bank oversight also exerts no significant influence on any of the other determinants of short-term debt
ratios.  This finding casts further doubt on the idea that bank board memberships provided important
monitoring of potentially risky short-term debt or systematically altered firms’ financing decisions.  It remains
to be determined whether bank relationships simply increased access to all kinds of financing, but the available
evidence on investment patterns suggests not.27
The interaction results how that bank attachment may slightly alter firms’ capital structure decisions,
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but that information problems–to he extent they can be identified–are not generally resolved.  Given the lack
of evidence in favor of conflicts of interest among the population as a whole, it is not surprising that bank
relationships seem to have little impact on the relevant variables.  These findings might be argued to support
both positive and negative interpretations of formal bank oversight.  The slightly higher leverage among bank-
attached firms may signal either increased access to desirable debt or persuasion by banks to over-lever.
Moreover, formal relationships do not seem to improve information flows outside of banks–that is, in capital
markets.  
CONCLUSIONS
This paper offers a number of insights into the impact of formalized universal banking relationships
during the later stages of the German industrialization a d focuses on four hypothesis in particular.  First, the
paper shows that formalized bank relationships are weakly associated with higher debt-equity ratios overall
but not with any change in the use of short-term debt.  The fact that bank-attached firms used short-term debt
in similar proportions as did unattached firms and that bank oversight altered none of the other determinants
of short-term debt ratios uggests hat affiliations were not directly related to bank lending on rolled-over, and
perhaps unsecured, lines of credit.  Though older firms generally used less debt relative to equity, this paper
suggests that formal bank relationships did not speed firms’ capital structure adjustments as they aged.
At the same time, relative to independent firms, bank-attached companies moved more rapidly away
from debt in response to increased cash flow.  Though appearances are suggestive, the inability to identify the
source of debt, as well as the non-linear relationship between cash-flow sensitivity and information problems,
makes it difficult o determine whether the behavior of attached firms reflects a desire to extricate themselves
from bank lending whenever profits allow.  The fact that increased cash flow did not prompt attached firms
to move away from short-term debt (under which category most bank debt would fall) tends to undermine such
an hypothesis.  Thus, the findings cast doubt on the standard perception of bank board representation as an
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important source of information or means of eliminating conflicts of interest between debt and equity holders.
At the same time, the results also undermine claims of banks’ abuse of inside information gathered on clients.
This paper also supplements the recent literature on capital structure and on relationship banking. By
demonstrating that debt-equity ratios decline significantly with both age and profitability and increase with firm
size, the findings bolster ecent heoretical work that emphasizes the importance of information quality and
availability in determining the mix of financial instruments u ed by corporate firms.  The findings provide no
compelling evidence of asset substitution resulting from conflicts of interest.  
This study underscores the need for further investigation f firm investment and financing patterns in
the later stages of the German industrialization.  Problems of asymmetric information and concerns about
potential financial distress clearly influenced the funding decisions firms made.  If firms’ capital structure
impinged on attainable levels or quality of investment, then it likely also affected the aggregate development
of industry and therefore economic growth.  The findings also clearly argue for deeper investigation of the role
of the stock exchanges in certifying firms’ quality, equalizing information problems, and opening up new
sources of capital for industry.  The negative relationship between leverage and stock market listings uncovered
here suggests that exchange listings offered such positive information effects.  Perhaps, contrary to common
wisdom, the universal banking system did not obviate an active, productive secondary market for securities.
The connection between i formation problems and the ultimate performance of the economy highlights
the potential importance of the financial system in industrial growth.  Financial intermediaries provide
information gathering and dissemination services, and the German banks, because of their universal structure
and supposed close links with industry, are believed in some quarters to have performed such functions more
successfully than specialized intermediaries.  The results of this paper, however, argue for a moderate
assessment of the impact of the German universal banks on the financing choices of industrial firms.  Thus,
this paper adds to the mounting evidence that the particular institutional structure of the German banks, and
especially the practice of formalized bank-firm relationships, provided little generalized boost to German
industry in the later stages of industrialization.
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1.See the discussion in Caroline Fohlin, “Universal Banking.”
2. This claim appears earlier in Jacob Riesser, Konzentration, and even earlier in Otto Jeidels, Das Verhältnis. 
Rudof Hilferding, Finanzkapital, argued that the banks wielded excessive control over industry.
3. See Harris and Raviv, “The Theory” and Hellwig, “Banking” for reviews of this large literature.  Examples include
Myers and Majluf, “Corporate Financing,” Diamond, “Financial Intermediation,” Gale and Hellwig, “Incentive-
compatible,” and Townsend, “Optimal Contracts,” as well as Ross, “The Determination,” Leland and Pyle,
“Information Asymmetries,” and Lee, Thakor, and Vora, “Screening.”  Brennan and Kraus, “Efficient Financing” and
Noe, “Capital Structure” set out models in which information asymmetry fails to generate a pecking order; thus,
leaving the issue open to empirical testing. 
4. Jensen and Meckling, “Theory of the Firm,” Myers, “Determinates,” and Stulz, “Managerial Discretion.”
5. Rajan, “Insiders and Outsiders” and Sharpe, “Asymmetric Information.”
6. Diamond, “Reputation” suggests that firms move from bank debt to marketable debt as they age, but Berger and
Udell, “Relationship Lending” and “The Economics,” find that U.S. public bond markets are mostly accessed by
the most seasoned firms (though other types of debt still precede equity).  The analysis here sheds light on these
finer details of the pecking order.  
7.Recent work on modern Germany–for example, Harhoff and Korting, “Lending Relationships” and Elsas and
Krahen, “Is Relationship Lending”–finds surprisingly little impact of banking relationships.  Gorton and Schmid,
“Universal Banking,” however, find a positive influence on market returns.  See also Cable, “Capital Market
Information.”  Among small and medium-sized American firms in the late 1980s, Petersen and Rajan, “The
Benefits,” and “The Effect,” Berger and Udell, “Relationship Lending,” and Blackwell and Winters, “Banking
Relationships,” find varying degrees of improvements in credit availability and terms depending on the length of
bank relationships.  In the Norwegian case, Ongena and Smith, “The Duration” find that firms become more likely
to terminate a relationship as the duration grows, and those most in need of bank financing maintain short
relationships with multiple banks.  Fohlin, “Relationship Banking” finds, for pre-war Germany, little impact of
formal relationships on rates of investment, profitability, or liquidity sensitivity of investment.  For Japan, Hoshi,
Kashyap, and Scharfstein, “Corporate Structure” find positive effects of relationships, while Weinstein and Yafeh,
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“On the Costs” reveal several costs. 
8.By law, German share companies had a supervisory board (Aufsichtsrat) to represent shareholder interests and
an executive board (Vorstand) to manage operations.  Calomiris, “The Costs” and Da Rin, “Understanding the
Development” set out a modernized version of the traditional view on Germany.  Riesser, Konzentrat on and
Jeidels, Das Verhältnis remain the contemporary classics on universal bank operations as viewed by an insider. 
See also DeLong, “Did Morgan’s Men” on the signaling value of J. P. Morgan’s men sitting on American boards.
9.See Fohlin, “Bank Securities” and “Balancing Act” on bank securities holdings.  There is very little available
evidence on proxy voting by universal banks, making it exceedingly difficult to know just how pervasive the
practice was.
10. This issue is quite complicated, and the evidence is mixed.  See Rajan and Zingales, “What Do We Know.” 
They point out that the costs of long-term bank relationships may limit the amount of debt that firms are willing to
take on.
11.The literature tends to use income to measure size.  Income is highly correlated with total assets in the current
sample.  Using natural logarithms helps control heteroscedasticity.
12.Banks’ preference for lending to high profit firms may induce a positive relationship; though if the firm’s
resistence to debt is strong enough, supply conditions may make little difference in equilibrium.
13.Bossaerts and Fohlin, “The Pricing” find that market-to-book ratio relates positively to stock returns.
14.See Fohlin, “The Rise.”  The 1904 volume is also the earliest volume available in the United States.  Data
collection from volumes held in Germany is underway.
15.Such information is available in the recent period, and board memberships prove to be positively correlated with
control rights.  See Gorton and Schmid, “Universal Banking,” Elston, “Investment,” and Chirinko, “Finance
Constraints.”  
16.Empirically, free cash flow and profitability are often closely related, and the difference often hinges on the
commitment of firms to specified dividend payouts.  In the current sample, raw correlations between different
definitions of profits and retained earnings range from 86 to 99 percent.  The definition used in the current
analysis, net profits (after taxes, dividends, and required payments to reserves) proxies for free cash flow as closely
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as possible.  In general, interest payments are included in costs and cannot be distinguished consistently,
preventing measurement of operating profits.  The inclusion of interest payments on debt may induce a spurious
negative correlation between cash flow and leverage, since, for a given level of operating profits, high debt firms
will have higher interest payments and lower cash flow.  Interest payments account for a small portion of firms’
costs, so spurious correlation is likely to account for only a part of the overall effect.  A problem would arise if
profits are positively correlated with leverage, but the artificial negative relationship offsets it–yielding no
observable correlation.  A second problem might arise if low cash flow indicates financial distress, since financially
distressed firms may simultaneously experience low profits and high leverage.  Possible corrections for both of
these problems are noted in the results section.
17.Fohlin (“Universal Banking” and “The Rise”) studies the characteristics of bank-attached firms in great depth. 
The findings of those papers are largely supported by the results here.
18.Having only one bank board membership makes little difference in median leverage, but the one extreme value
belongs to one of the exclusively attached firms.
19. The KS and KW tests were implemented in Stata5; the manual provides full details of the tests.
20.The slight hesitation stems from the uncertainty over the sources of short-term debt.  It is still possible that the
sources of such lending varied systematically with formal bank oversight, and that bank-affiliated companies
gained priority access to funding from the banks placed on their boards.  The origin of funding matters if it affected
the cost of financing or the choice of investment.  Such data are missing for most firms, though the effects of
higher financing costs should appear in the quantity of financing used, the dependence of firms’ investments on
internal funding, or the profits or rates of return of firms–a promising area for further research. 
21. I use the Hadi method for identifying multivariate outliers and find 8 such outliers at the five percent level of
confidence.  Robust regression and Hadi outlier selection were implemented in Stata5; both methods are discussed in
the Stata5 and Stata6 manuals.  Appendix B reports a comparison of results using robust regression, Tobit, and OLS.
22. Coefficients of both age and profits present potential problems.  Given the possibility of survivorship bias due
to the stock market decline of 1900-01, it is important to note that the coefficient estimates for firm age appear to
be unaffected by the inclusion of firms that were founded after the crash.  Though these firms appear to have
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somewhat higher leverage than the rest of the sample, there is no significant difference in leverage between the
firms founded shortly before the crash and immediately after.  Moreover, excluding the post-1901 firms from the
sample does not alter the regression results on age.  The difficulty with the profit variable involves the possible
introduction of a spurious negative correlation between profits and leverage due to the subtraction of interest
payments from gross operating profits and simultaneity between financial distress and high leverage.  As a test of
the first problem, I have estimated interest payments based on the amount of debt reported in firms’ balance sheets
and the median interest rate on bonds, 4 percent (since only a quarter of firms reported interest rates, and then only
on some bonds, I could only estimate the actual interest rate for all firms and all types of debt).  Adding interest
payments back into net profits results in equivalent regression findings to those reported here.  In order to test for
simultaneity, I have also rerun the regressions with an indicator variable for the most distressed firms (those in
liquidation) and removing those firms altogether.  While firms in liquidation experienced clearly lower profits, all
of the findings are completely robust to both changes in model specification.  Additional regression results for all
of these corrections are available from the author.
23.Size is also often hypothesized to proxy for information availability, but it may actually add little information
that firm age and the stock market listing variable do not already capture.  Among joint-stock companies, size, age,
and stock market listing are all very strongly related to one another.
24.Interestingly, Berlin market listing remains a strong negative indicator of short-term debt ratios, and listing on
the provincial exchanges is also significantly negatively associated with short-term debt.  This finding provides
further evidence of a strong link between listings and securities issues and suggests that gaining and maintaining
listings improved information availability.  Since provincial exchange listing is significant for short-term but not
overall leverage, the results also suggests that the provincial exchanges may have been more important for bonds
than they were for equity securities.  
25.Magnitude and significance, for example, are substantially diminished by the inclusion of controls for firm age
and stock market listing variables (equation 3), and the reported specifications represent the strongest results on
the bank-attachment variable.  The significance and influence of the Berlin listing variable could indicate the
importance of stock market listings for ameliorating information problems, but as noted previously, this possibility
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needs to be pursued more thoroughly in future work.  The formed interaction variables are very highly correlated
with the attachment variable, thus introducing multicollinearity and potentially reducing the perceived significance
of the attachment variable.  Without interaction variables, the attachment indicator is more robust to various
specifications, but clearly the independent variables enter differently for attached and independent firms.  When
analyzing the attached and independent samples separately, the estimated constants are statistically insignificant 
both sub-samples (additional results may be obtained from the author).
26.Actual levels of collateral were not usually reported and therefore cannot be regularly observed for the firms in
this sample, hence the use of tangibility as a proxy.
27. Fohlin, “Relationship Banking,” shows that, in the early twentieth century, bank attachment (controlling for
selection bias) was not associated with higher investment or with lower liquidity sensitivity of investment–a
common measure of firms’ liquidity constraints.  On the other hand, Gorton and Schmid, “Universal Banking,”
find that bank relationships raise firms market returns in modern Germany.  Edwards and Fischer (Banks, Finance
and Investment), however, offer a different view.
TABLE 1
HYPOTHESIZED FACTORS IN LEVERAGE DECISIONS
Factors in leverage decisions Explanation Bank debt/
liabilities
Bank debt/
total debt
Total debt/
equity
Bank board memberships (possible causes and effects thereof)
interim monitoring of bank
debt (cause)
asset substitution, excessive risk
reduced
++ ++ + 
ex post monitoring, decreased
investigation costs (effect)
agency cost of debt lowered ++ ++ + 
interest on current accounts
(effect)
bankers earn more from lending than
from equity issues or returns
++ ++ + 
signaling firm quality to equity
markets (cause)
seal of approval due to ex ante
monitoring (selection process)
- 0 -
proxy votes and direct equity
stakes (cause)
bank gains votes (control rights)
through underwriting process
- 0 -
underwriting commissions and
fees (effect)
bankers earn more from equity
issues or returns than from lending
- 0 -
Information asymmetry
age proxy for information availability - - -
proxy for lower default probability
(endogenous)
- 0 -
size proxy for information availability- - -
tangibility of assets proxy for collateralizable assets + ? ++ 
cash flow   debt is costly; prefer inside funds- ? -
market-to-book value of sharesproxy for reputation in equity market- 0 -
Agency costs (conflicts of interest) 
age proxy for lower default probability
(endogenous)
- 0 -
size proxy for diversification, lower
bankruptcy risk & investigation costs
+ ? ++ 
tangibility of assets proxy for liquidation value + ? ++ 
cash flow   debt limits overinvestment + ? ++ 
market-to-book value of sharesproxy for growth opportunities - ? -
TABLE 2
SAMPLE MEANS AND CORRELATES OF BANK OVERSIGHT
Variable Bank oversight No bank
oversight
Probit 1 Probit 2
Debt/equity 0.88
1.01
0.63
0.64
0.07
0.12
0.12
0.02
Fixed assets/
total assets
0.56
0.24
0.60
0.24
-0.07
0.51
-0.11
0.40
Natural log of
income
6.18
1.52
5.43
1.54
0.05
0.03
0.03
0.23
Net profits/
total assets
0.04
0.04
0.09
0.59
-0.58
0.38
-0.22
0.77
Market-to-face value of shares 167.22
74.44
149.65
64.07
Age of firma 13.76
9.73
16.49
12.69
-0.01
0.01
-0.01
0.07
Listed on Berlin stock exchangeb 0.30
0.46
0.14
0.35
0.20
0.02
0.16
0.07
Listed on other German stock
exchange
0.22
0.42
0.17
0.38
0.11
0.12
0.10
0.23
p value of chi-squared test 0.00 0.01
pseudo-R2 0.09 0.12
predicted probability
observed probability
0.19
0.22
0.21
0.24
Number of firmsc 67
(33)
253
(66)
303 274
Note. Variables are computed using book values.   Standard deviations are given in italics below means.  The dependent
variable in the probit models is a binomial variable taking the value one when the firm has a bank representative on its board and
zero otherwise.  Probit 2 includes 14 industry indicator variables, while probit 1 does not.  The probit results are the change in the
probability of having bank oversight given an infinitesimal change in the independent variable (or the discrete change from being
unlisted to being listed in the case of the two listing variables).  P-values of z-statistics (two-sided tests) for the probit model are
given in italics.  Eight extreme outliers are removed from the probit models using the Hadi multivariate selection method.  
a Age of firm is number of years since registration as a joint-stock company.  
b The two listing variables take the value one for true and zero for false.  
c The number of firms with share prices reported (market-to-face value of shares) is given in parentheses below the number
of firms in the sample overall.
TABLE 3
COMPARISONS OF LEVERAGE BY BANK-AFFILIATION CATEGORY
Statistic No banks Private Banks Provincial Banks Great Banks a
Mean 0.63 0.67 0.96 0.77
Smallest 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
5 0.00 0.00 0.09 0.06
10 0.03 0.02 0.19 0.14
25 0.17 0.22 0.32 0.25
50 0.48 0.50 0.68 0.58
75 0.80 0.88 1.07 1.28
90 1.47 1.65 1.89 1.94
Largest 4.13 2.48 7.41 2.47
Number of firms 236 17 37 30
P(t): any versus no
bank 
0.07
P(t): provincial
vs. great banks
0.42
P(oneway
ANOVA)
0.07
P(Kruskal-Wallis) 0.19
Note. Leverage is the ratio of debt to equity measured at nominal book values.  T-statistics result from two-sided tests.
Kruskal-Wallis i  a Chi-squared statistic testing if multiple samples come from the same population.  Oneway ANOVA tests for
differences among the means of several samples.  
a Great banks are the largest nine universal banks; provincial banks are all others.
 
TABLE 4
TWO-SAMPLE KOLMOGOROV-SMIRNOV TESTS FOR EQUALITY OF 
LEVERAGE DISTRIBUTION FUNCTIONS
D/E ratio
less than
Any bank Provincial banks Great banks a
Difference P-Value Difference P-Value Difference P-Value
1 0.20 0.08 0.22 0.18 0.17 0.49
2 0.18 0.07 0.22 0.08 0.14 0.62
5 0.17 0.07 0.20 0.11 0.14 0.56
no limit 0.17 0.07 0.20 0.09 0.14 0.57
Note. Leverage is the ratio of debt to equity measured at nominal bookvalues.  P-values are for the combined test that the
given category’s distribution is greater or less than that of the omitted category and are corrected based on an empirical continuity
correction.  Difference refers to the largest difference in values of the distribution.  
a Great banks are the largest nine universal banks; provincial banks are all others.
TABLE 5
COMPARISONS OF DEBT MATURITY BY BANK-AFFILIATION CATEGORY
Statistic No banks Private Banks Provincial Banks Great Banks a
Mean 0.48 0.40 0.46 0.52
Smallest 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02
10 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.07
25 0.11 0.09 0.15 0.20
50 0.41 0.32 0.35 0.50
75 0.98 0.57 0.94 0.85
90 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Largest 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Number of firms 224 16 36 29
P(t): any versus no
bank 
0.73
P(t): provincial
vs. great banks
0.53
P(oneway
ANOVA)
0.76
P(Kruskal-Wallis) 0.76
Note. Debt maturity is the ratio of short-term debt o total debt measured at nominal book values.  T-statistics result from two-
sided tests.  Kruskal-Wallis is a Chi-squared statistic testing if multiple samples come from the same population.  Oneway ANOVA
tests for differences among the means of several samples. 
a Great banks are the largest nine universal banks; provincial banks are all others.
TABLE 6
CORRELATES OF FIRM LEVERAGE
Variable Equation 1 Equation 2 Equation 3 Equation 4 Equation 5
Fixed assets/
total assets
0.17
1.24
0.08
0.59
0.08
0.63
0.04
0.34
0.05
0.35
Natural log of
income
0.04
1.44
0.07
3.50
0.08
4.10
0.09
4.56
0.09
4.53
Net profits/
total assets
-2.42
-2.90
-4.35
-8.97
-4.26
9.09
-4.44
-9.58
-4.44
-9.32
Market-to-face value of
shares
-0.00
-0.37
Age of firma -0.01
-2.85
-0.01
-2.67
-0.01
-3.08
Listed on Berlin stock
exchangeb
-0.16
-2.09
-0.25
-1.92
Listed on other German
stock exchange
-0.01
-0.17
-0.13
-1.04
Age x listed in Berlin 0.01
1.02
Age x listed on other
German exchange
0.01
1.34
Constant 0.23
0.94
3.87
8.57
3.99
9.13
0.60
2.95
4.05
9.08
P(F-statistic) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Number of firms 97 310 310 309 310 
Note. The dependent variable is the ratio of book values of debt to equity.  Regressions use a variant of the Huber limited-
influence estimator.  T-statistics (two-sided tests) are given in italics.  
a Age of firm is number of years since registration as a joint-stock company.  
b The two listing variables take the value one for true and zero for false.  
TABLE 7
CORRELATES OF FIRM LEVERAGE AND THE EFFECTS OF BANK RELATIONSHIPS 
Variable Equation 1 Equation 2 Equation 3
Bank board member 0.70
2.11
0.65
1.97
0.59
1.77
Fixed assets/
total assets
0.22
1.47
0.19
1.27
0.14
0.95
Bank x fixed assets -0.43
-1.58
-0.40
-1.48
-0.37
-1.37
Natural log of
income
0.05
2.50
0.07
3.16
0.08
3.46
Bank x income -0.01
-0.22
-0.03
-0.63
-0.03
-0.55
Net profits/
total assets
-2.82
-5.50
-2.80
-5.44
-2.91
-5.68
Bank x net profits -4.45
-2.94
-4.54
-3.00
-4.26
-2.82
Age of firma -0.01
-2.95
-0.01
-2.89
Bank board member x age 0.01
1.61
0.01
1.85
Listed on Berlin stock exchangeb -0.14
-1.75
Listed on other stock exchange 0.01
0.16
Constant 0.49
2.28
0.55
2.53
3.95
8.83
P(F-statistic) 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Number of firms 309 309 309 
Note. The dependent variable is the ratio of book values of debt to equity.  Regressions use a variant of the Huber limited-
influence estimator, and t-statistics (two-sided tests) are given in italics. 
a Age of firm is number of years since registration as a joint-stock company.  
b The two listing variables take the value one for true and zero for false.  
TABLE 8
CORRELATES OF DEBT MATURITY AND THE EFFECTS OF BANK RELATIONSHIPS 
Variable Equation 1 Equation 2 Equation 3 Equation 4
Bank board member 0.59
1.77
0.09
0.82
0.11
0.80
-0.18
-0.45
Fixed assets/
total assets
0.14
0.95
-0.09
-1.77
-0.05
-0.89
-0.55
-2.51
Bank x fixed assets -0.37
-1.37
-0.12
-1.40
-0.17
-1.49
0.20
0.58
Natural log of
income
0.08
3.46
0.02
2.25
0.02
1.77
0.06
1.91
Bank x income -0.03
-0.55
-0.00
-0.13
0.01
0.31
-0.03
-0.47
Net profits/
total assets
-2.91
-5.68
-0.82
-4.95
-0.94
-4.46
-3.05
-3.94
Bank x net profits -4.26
-2.82
0.53
1.08
0.22
0.35
3.20
1.62
Age of firma -0.01
-2.89
-0.00
-1.41
-0.00
-1.60
-0.00
-0.35
Bank board member x age 0.01
1.85
0.00
0.23
-0.00
-0.21
0.01
1.14
Listed on Berlin stock exchangeb -0.14
-1.75
-0.07
-2.83
-0.10
-2.82
-0.17
-1.67
Listed on other stock exchange 0.01
0.16
-0.04
-1.57
-0.06
-1.84
-0.15
-1.62
Constant 3.95
8.83
0.44
3.02
0.18
1.96
0.80
1.58
P(F-statistic) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Number of firms 309 310 309 228 
Note. The dependent variable is the ratio of debt o equity in equation 1, short-term debt divided by all other debt plus equity
in equation 2, short-term debt dividedby equity in equation 3, and short-term debt divided by long-term debt in equation 4.  All
ratios use book values.  Regressions use a variant of the Huber limited-influence estimator, and t-statistics (two-sided tests) are
given in italics. 
a Age of firm is number of years since registration as a joint-stock company.  
b The two listing variables take the value one for true and zero for false.  
APPENDIX A
ALTERNATIVE DEFINITIONS OF LEVERAGE
Percentile Definition 1 Definition 2 Definition 3
Mean 0.33 0.34 0.35
Smallest 0.00 0.00 0.00
5 0.00 0.00 0.00
10 0.05 0.05 0.05
25 0.18 0.19 0.19
50 0.33 0.35 0.35
75 0.47 0.49 0.50
90 0.61 0.61 0.62
95 0.67 0.67 0.68
Largest 0.88 0.89 0.93
Number of firms 320 320 320
Note. Definition one is the ratio of outside liabilities (Fremdkapital) to total iabilities (including net worth).  Definition two
is the ratio of debt o the sum of debt, total share capital, and reserves.  Definition three is the ratio of debt to the sum of debt,
ordinary share capital, and reserves.
APPENDIX B
CORRELATES OF LEVERAGE–THREE ESTIMATORS 
Variable Huber
Robust
Regression
Tobit with
Outliers
Removed
OLS with
Outliers
Removed
Fixed assets/
total assets
0.04
0.34
-0.08
-0.51
-0.07
-0.41
Natural log of
income
0.09
4.56
0.10
3.66
0.09
3.16
Net profits/
total assets
-4.44
-9.58
-6.91
-9.15
-6.35
-8.54
Age of firma -0.01
-2.67
-0.01
-2.29
-0.01
-2.38
Listed on Berlin stock exchangeb -0.16
-2.09
-0.21
-2.17
-0.20
-2.06
Listed on other German stock exchange -0.01
-0.17
0.04
0.47
0.05
0.56
Constant 0.60
2.95
0.33
1.36
0.43
1.80
P(F-statistic, Chi-squared statitistic) 0.00 0.00 0.00
Pseudo-R-squared, adjusted R-squared 0.21 0.26
Number of firms 309 303 303
Note. The dependent variable is the ratio of book values of debt o equity.  In columns two and three, outliers are id ntified
using the Hadi multivariate method.  T-statistics (two-sided tests) are given in italics. 
a Age of firm is number of years since registration as a joint-stock company.  
b The two listing variables take the value one for true and zero for false.  
